2026-04-02

Official Report on the Castle Peak, CA, Avalanche That Killed 9 Reveals Critical Decision Errors, Undeployed Airbags, and Victims Buried 8 Feet Deep





The Sierra Avalanche Center has published its official investigation report on the February 17, 2026, Perry Peak near Frog Lake/Castle Peak avalanche that killed nine skiers and guides northwest of Lake Tahoe. The report, publically viewable on Avalanche.org, documents snowpack conditions, the route taken by the party, an account of the companion rescue, and a set of observations about group travel decisions that investigators say contributed to the scale of the tragedy.



Related: “We Are Heartbroken”—Blackbird Mountain Guides Speak After Castle Peak, CA, Avalanche



Nine people died. Six survived. The slide remains the deadliest avalanche in California history and the worst in the United States in 45 years.

The report opens with a detailed account of the snowpack conditions in the weeks preceding the accident, conditions that, taken together, created what investigators describe as one of the most loaded and unstable configurations the Central Sierra Nevada had seen in half a century.



Related: Investigation Begins Into Deadly Castle Peak, CA, Avalanche as Families of Victims Speak Out



The existing snowpack entering February had been built largely by major storms in late December and early January. A dry high-pressure period from January 8 to February 10 then left the range almost snowfall-free for more than a month. The report notes that during this interval, “a 2 to 4 inch layer of near surface facets formed across NW-N-NE aspects,” precisely the aspects of the terrain where the accident occurred. On February 10, that facet layer was buried under a thin rain crust in areas below 8,600 to 8,800 feet, followed by 4 to 6 inches of new snow. That crust-facet combination sat latent in the snowpack, waiting.



Related: [UPDATE] All 9 Bodies Have Been Recovered from Castle Peak Avalanche, CA



Then the storm arrived.



“A strong winter storm moved through the area from February 15 through February 19,” the report states. “During this period, the Central Sierra Snow Lab (CSSL), located about 4 miles southwest of the accident site at 6,890′, recorded 111 inches of total snowfall.” Ridgetop wind data from the top of the Siberia Chairlift at Palisades Tahoe, 20 miles to the south, recorded sustained WSW winds averaging 35 mph across the storm period, with gusts ranging from 60 to 125 mph.

At the precise hour the avalanche ran, conditions were at their most extreme. “At that time, the wind speeds for the previous hour averaged 75.6 mph with a maximum gust of 125.8 mph at the top of the Siberia Chairlift,” the report states. Snowfall at the Central Sierra Snow Lab was measuring 4 inches per hour from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. — the two hours immediately before the slide released.

The report is explicit about what this loading meant for the slope: “The avalanche occurred on a slope where the wind had redistributed the snowfall, piling it into drifts far deeper than the amount measured at nearby weather stations.” Non-persistent storm snow instabilities, the report notes, were “widespread during this storm which included avalanches failing on the Feb 15 old/new snow interface, on graupel within the new snow, and on needle crystals within the new snow. The entirety of the new snow load was also on top of the layer of near surface facets that were buried on Feb 10.”

In total, 40 inches of settled storm snow had accumulated from the start of the storm to 11 a.m. on February 17, the hour the avalanche ran.



A detail not previously reported publicly: the 15-person party was not a single group. The report reveals that “two groups were on guided trips to the Frog Lake Huts in the Castle Peak area on Donner Summit, Feb 15–17, 2026. The groups were made up of 6 females with 2 guides, and another group of 3 males with 2 guides all from the same guide service.” On the morning of February 17, “the members of these two guided groups from the same guide service were combined into a single group with four guides for the return to the trailhead.”

The combined group of 15 climbed to Red Dot Pass with the Frog Lake Hutmeisters before parting ways. “From the top of the pass, the Hutmeisters returned back south to the Frog Lake Huts. The guided group descended down the north side of Red Dot Pass.” The group then moved into uphill travel, skinning west, “eventually into the avalanche runout zone below the north slopes of Perry Peak.”

At some point before the avalanche released, two members of the group fell behind: “Guide #4 in the back was assisting Client #11 with a ski binding toepiece issue.” That equipment failure, the report would later note, likely saved their lives.

The report draws on survivor testimony published by the New York Times on February 28, 2026, to reconstruct the moments of the avalanche itself.

“A ski guide in the group yelled ‘Avalanche’ and Client #10 looked up to see ‘a wall of white with strange blurs of colors,'” the report states, quoting the Times account. “He realized that the colors were the tumbling skis and clothing of the other skiers. He dove behind a dead tree and was quickly buried by the avalanche debris.”

Client #11 and Guide #4, still behind with the binding repair, reached the rest of the group moments later and found a debris field. They had not seen the avalanche occur.

The report also confirms for the first time that several members of the group were equipped with avalanche airbag backpacks. “None were deployed in this accident.”



The slide itself struck a “sparsely treed, cross-loaded, north-facing slope northeast of Donner Summit.” It entrained enough snow to bury 13 people. The crown was never visible—new snow was filling it in even as the slide ran. “The avalanche is believed to have been a soft slab of size D2 to D2.5 with the exact weak layer and bed surface unknown.” It ran approximately 400 vertical feet, through trees at mid-path and below. SAR responders estimated the debris field at 100 feet wide.

“It is unclear,” the report states plainly, “if this avalanche was triggered by the party or was a natural avalanche.”

The most striking new material in the report is the step-by-step account of the companion rescue, an account of how two people, one a guide and one a client, worked through a debris field in a blizzard with 125 mph wind gusts on the ridge above them.

Client #10 forced himself out from beneath the debris and shouted that people were buried, pointing to the last location he had seen his companions. Guide #4 began a transceiver search. Client #11 spotted a ski pole protruding from the debris surface, and it was moving. He dug to find Client #9, who “had an airway along his arm and pole up to the snow surface” and indicated he was not seriously hurt.

Guide #4 located Clients #8 and #7 via transceiver search and probe. Both were initially excavated only enough to expose their faces. “While digging for Client #7 they encountered the leg of another group member and the backpack of yet another group member.” Continuing to dig, the group uncovered Guide #3 and Client #6. “Both were assessed as showing no signs of life.”



The report notes that the group then redirected to fully excavate Clients #7 and #8, both assessed as injured. A decision was made to move the six survivors downslope to a position away from the avalanche path. “An emergency shelter was constructed by Guide #4, and care was given to Clients #7 and #8.”

Client #10 had placed a 911 call around 11:30 a.m., when the search began. SAR teams were dispatched, including ski teams from the Castle Peak trailhead, and snowcat teams heading toward the Frog Lake Huts via the Tahoe Donner Cross Country Center. Tahoe Nordic Search and Rescue reached the accident site at approximately 5:30 p.m. By that point, roughly two feet of new snow had settled over the debris field. SAR responders could only locate the edges and toe of the debris by the depth their boots penetrated the snowpack: on the debris, they could stand and walk. Off the edge of it, they sank past the waist.

TNSAR members found the eight remaining buried victims that evening. The report states they were “all buried 3 to 8 feet deep within a 20′ x 20′ area.” All eight were confirmed dead. The six survivors were then escorted, on skis, back up and over Red Dot Pass to the Frog Lake Huts, from where they were evacuated by snowcat to the Tahoe Donner Cross Country Center.

The ninth victim was not recovered until February 20, following a sustained mitigation operation using PG&E helicopters deploying approximately 5,500-pound, 660-gallon water buckets on the slope. No secondary avalanches were triggered during mitigation. The final four victims were recovered on February 21.



The investigators offer four specific findings. First, that the binding failure which delayed Guide #4 and Client #11 may have been the reason both survived, and that their subsequent companion rescue directly saved lives: “2 of the 4 buried survivors required companion rescue to excavate the snow that covered their airways. The rapid location and excavation of these two individuals was lifesaving.”

Second, that “this group traveled below avalanche terrain and through the runout zone of an avalanche path during a period when a natural or human triggered avalanche was likely to very likely.”

Third, the accepted best practice of “exposing only one person at a time to avalanche terrain” was not followed.

Fourth, and most broadly, that group size mattered: “This group consisted of 15 people. Analysis of past avalanche accidents has indicated that larger group sizes (4 or more people) have higher chances of being caught in avalanches,” citing peer-reviewed research published in Wilderness & Environmental Medicine in 2016.

The report is direct about what remains unknown: “Many of the details surrounding this accident and the events leading up to it remain unknown,” including human factors, decision-making, specific travel plans, and the precise mechanics of the avalanche itself. It notes that the account relies heavily on the testimony of two survivors who were near the back of the group and had no role in route planning. “If other survivors who were closer to the front of the group and part of the group of women eventually choose to share their story, it may include different information and details.”

Both the Nevada County Sheriff’s Office and the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health continue to conduct separate, active investigations into the incident. No findings or charges have been announced from either.

The full report is available at Avalanche.org. Backcountry travelers are encouraged to check daily avalanche forecasts at SierraAvalancheCenter.org and to carry, and know how to use, an avalanche transceiver, probe, and shovel at all times.

Castle Peak Avalanche Official Report: Photos and Media

































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